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Abstract
We investigate a situation in which gains from cooperation are represented by a
cooperative TU-game and a solution proposes a division of coalitional worths. In
addition, asymmetries among players outside the game are captured by a vector of
exogenous weights. If a solution measures players’ payoffs inherent in the game, and
a coalition has formed, then the question is how to measure players’ overall payoffs in
that coalition. For this we introduce the notion of a composite solution. We provide an
axiomatic characterization of a specific composite solution, in which exogenous weights
enter in a proportional fashion.
JEL Classification: C71
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1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility describes the possibilities for any coalition of
players to obtain a payoff. A solution concept for TU games is based on this information
and proposes a (set of) distribution(s) of coalitional worth. As a solution only uses the data
of the game itself, it has to ignore exogenous asymmetries among the players that are not
captured by the characteristic function. However, it is undoubted that such external weights
also have an influence on the final distribution of payoffs.
A common example for this fact is power measurement in a parliament. There a (sim-
ple) game describes the possibilities to form majorities and application of power indices
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determines a distribution of power within the parliament. A frequent criticism towards this
approach is that parties’ external strengths, such as distribution of seats, are faded out.
In particular, power indices do not conform with ideas of proportionality with respect to
exogenous asymmetries (see, e.g., Snyder et al. (2005) for a debate on power indices).
In this paper we tackle the question how to bring together a solution concept, which
reflects players’ weights inherent in the game, and their external weights. This leads to a
notion of an overall payoff, that takes both sources into account. We adopt a normative
point of view and ask for plausible requirements for merging internal and external weights.
To answer the question we introduce the concept of a composite solution. More precisely,
a composite solution F takes each collection (α, S, v, ϕ) of an exogenous weights vector
α, a coalition S, a cooperative TU-game v and a solution concept ϕ to a distribution of
coalitional worth with the interpretation that Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) reflects player i’s overall payoff
within coalition S, when v describes the gains from cooperation. We present four axioms for
composite solutions and show that they uniquely characterize a specific composite solution,
in which exogenous weights enter in a proportional fashion.
The idea to express differences in players’ external characteristics via (strictly posi-
tive) weights goes back to Shapley (1953a), where it was used to characterize a particu-
lar parametrized solution (the weighted Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953b), Owen (1968),
Kalai and Samet (1987), Haeringer (2006)). A parametrized solution assigns a payoff for
each player to each pair (α, v). In contrast to the above papers, we take solution concepts
ϕ defined on the set of all games rather than on the collection of all pairs (α, v). Hence,
we let the players play the game as if there were no external asymmetries among them and,
after that, we view external weights as having a redistributive power in a composite solution.
This will be important when discussing the axioms we use for the characterization of our
specific composite solution. Clearly, if we fix the solution concept ϕ and take only the grand
coalition into account, then a parametrized solution can be seen as a composite solution as
well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains basic notions and definitions such as
the one for composite solutions. Moreover, we present and discuss four axioms for composite
solutions. In Section 3 we show that these four axioms, being independent, characterize a
specific composite solution. Section 4 closes with some final remarks.
2 Composite solutions and axioms
A cooperative game with transferable utility - or simply a (TU-)game - is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and v : 2N −→ R is a characteristic function on
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N satisfying v (∅) = 0. For any coalition S ∈ 2N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the
members of S can obtain a total amount of v (S) by agreeing to cooperate. In what follows
we keep N fixed and identify a game (N, v) with its characteristic function v. For S ∈ 2N
define the subgame with respect to S, (N, vS), by vS (T ) = v (S ∩ T ) for all T ∈ 2
N . Note
that vS is also an n-player game (possibly with vS(N) = v(S) = 0). The set of all games on
the player set N will be denoted by G. Clearly, if a game v is in the set G, then so is any
of its subgames. A game v ∈ G is monotonic if v (S) ≥ v(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊇ T .
The set of all monotonic games on the player set N is denoted by Gm, Gm ⊂ G.
A solution (for a TU-game) is a mapping ϕ : G → RN taking each v ∈ G to a single vector
in RN , i.e., it assigns a real number ϕi (v) to each player i ∈ N . The set of all solutions on G
will be denoted by S. A solution ϕ ∈ S is positive if ϕi (v) ≥ 0 (i ∈ N) holds for all v ∈ G
m.
The set of all positive solutions on G will be denoted by S+, S+ ⊂ S.
Composite solutions, as defined next, are designed to incorporate exogenous weights as
well as endogenous distributions of coalitional worth. For this we combine a vector of weights
with a solution. Thus, a composite solution does not only reflect players’ opportunities within
a cooperative game, but also respects asymmetries among the players outside the game.
Let D := RN++×2
N×G×S and D0 ⊆ D. Formally, a composite solution F : D0 −→ RN on
D0 assigns a vector of players’ payoffs to each tuple (α, S, v, ϕ) consisting of a strictly positive
weight vector, a coalition, a cooperative game, and a solution. We interpret a composite
solution as follows: Suppose that the game v represents the possibilities for obtaining payoffs
from cooperation. The vector α represents asymmetries outside v, and ϕ is the solution that
measures players’ payoffs inherent in v. Provided that a coalition S ∈ 2N has formed, we
view the real number Fi(α, S, v, ϕ) as “player i’s overall payoff” in S. Put in another way,
taking external weights into account, a player’s internal payoff is transformed to an overall
one.
Next we ask for a “correct way” to combine players’ internal and external weights within
a composite solution. We propose the following four axioms:
Ignorance of Outsiders (IO): For all (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D0 and all i ∈ N \ S,
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) = 0.
Sign Inheritance (SI): For all (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D0 and all i ∈ S,
ϕi (vS) > 0 ⇒ Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) > 0 and ϕi (vS) = 0 ⇒ Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) = 0.
Payoff Redistribution (PR): For all (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D0,∑
k∈S
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) .
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Constant Transformation rates per Weight (CTW): For all (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D0 and all
i, j ∈ S with ϕi (vS) > 0 and ϕj (vS) > 0,
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ)
ϕi (vS)
αi
=
Fj (α, S, v, ϕ)
ϕj (vS)
αj
.
All axioms rely on the following situation: Suppose coalition S has formed and an overall
payoff distribution (among all players in N) shall be determined by a composite solution.
First of all, it is natural that all “outsiders”, i.e., players i 6∈ S shall not obtain a payoff.
That is the content of the IO axiom.
The remaining axioms concentrate on the distribution of payoffs within coalition S. In the
same spirit that solutions are based on the data of the (unrestricted) game, the distribution
in S should be based on that part of the game that S is concerned with, i.e., on the restricted
game vS.
Now, SI requires that the incorporation of external weights can neither create positive
overall payoff, when the internal payoff was zero, nor can it destroy a positive internal
payoff. In particular, this axiom rules out extreme cases in which only players’ external
characteristics (captured by α) determine their overall payoffs in a coalition. Note that the
assumption of positive players’ weights correctly supports the idea behind the SI axiom.
The PR axiom requires that total overall payoff in the coalition S is the same as total
internal payoff (determined by ϕ applied to vS). Put in other words, external weights do
not enter the game itself and, hence, they are neither productive nor destructive: What was
distributed among the players in a coalition according to ϕ should exactly be redistributed
among them when external weights enter the scene.
CTW is the key axiom that specifies the role of external weights compared to internal
payoffs. For example, suppose on the one hand that within coalition S players i, j obtain
the same (internal) payoff ϕi(vS) = ϕj(vS). But on the other hand, if player i’s weight is
twice as high as player j’s weight, then i’s overall payoff Fi should also be twice as high as
j’s overall payoff Fj. Hence, if internal payoffs are equal, the ratio of overall payoffs matches
the ratio of players’ weights.
Reading the CTW axiom in another way, suppose player i’s internal payoff were three times
as much as player j’s payoff. However, to arrive at the same overall payoff, this can exactly
be “compensated” by external weights, namely by αj being three times higher than αi.
In general, the CTW axiom describes, how overall payoffs should result from the internal
payoff distribution. It is based only on exogenous weights, since all asymmetries among the
players outside the game are captured by the weights vector α. Now, the ratio Fi/ϕi describes
the rate with which player i’s internal payoff is transformed. Then CTW requires that the
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ratio of two players’ transformation rate is given by the ratio of their external weights. Put
in other words, the vector of transformation rates (Fi/ϕi)i∈S,ϕi(vS)>0 is proportional to the
(corresponding) vector of external weights. Thus, the rate of transformation per unit of
external weight is constant across players in a coalition. To sum, with CTW in place, αi
represents the rate with which player i’s internal payoff transforms to the final (overall) one.
3 A characterization result
The concept of external weights is frequently associated with ideas of proportionality. For
example, the distribution of seats in a parliament is supposed to have a direct effect on
how responsibilities in a government are shared. Consequently, the proportional version of
a composite solution, denoted Φ should read as follows:
As domain for Φ we take D¯ := RN++ × 2
N × Gm × S+ ⊂ D, that restricts attention to
monotonic games and positive solutions. As an example, D¯ covers monotonic simple games
and power indices as solutions. Then define the composite solution Φ : D¯ −→ RN by1
(1) Φi (α, S, v, ϕ) =


αiϕi (vS)∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
·
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) , i ∈ S,
0, i 6∈ S
(i ∈ N).
Thus, within a coalition S exactly the worth σ :=
∑
k∈S ϕk(vS) is redistributed among the
agents in S. Without external weights, player i’s (i ∈ S) share of σ was ϕi(vS)/
∑
k∈S ϕk(vS).
This share is now multiplied with his external weight αi. Normalization, i.e., the sum of
shares equals 1, yields the form in (1). Note also that Φ is homogeneous of degree zero
w.r.t. the weights vector, which means that only relative weights among agents matter.
Before we proceed with a characterization result for Φ on D¯ using the four axioms from
the previous section, consider the following example:
Example: Let v be a monotonic simple game, and let ϕ be an efficient, symmetric solution
that satisfies the null player property. Furthermore, let S be a minimal winning coalition
in v. Then it is readily seen that ϕ allocates the payoff vS(S) = 1 equally among the
members in S and assigns zero to all players not in S. Now, with external weights2 the
composite solution proposes a share of αi/α(S) to player i, where α(S) is the sum of weights
in S. Thus Φ allocates vS(S) within S proportional to players’ external weights. Using the
interpretation of a parliament, such an allocation is widely observed in problems of sharing
responsibilities within a government. 
1We use the convention that 0
0
= 0 (for example, for the case that vS is the zero game).
2Here, we can think of seats in the parliament or number of voters that voted for a party.
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Theorem: A composite solution F : D¯ −→ RN satisfies IO, SI, PR, and CTW if and only
if F = Φ. Moreover, all four axioms are logically independent.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps:
Step 1: Φ satisfies the four axioms on D¯
By construction, Φ clearly satisfies IO. On the domain D¯, Φ always assigns non-negative
payoffs, since any considered game v is monotonic and ϕ is positive. From the construction
and recalling that weights are strictly positive, is is readily seen that, Φi(α, S, v, ϕ) > 0 holds
if and only if ϕi(vS) > 0 is true. Hence, SI is satisfied.
Next, for all (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D¯ we have
∑
i∈S
Φi (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
i∈S αiϕi (vS)∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) =
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) ,
which shows that the PR axiom is also fulfilled.
Finally, we establish CTW. Take (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D¯, i, j ∈ S with ϕi (vS) > 0 and ϕj (v) > 0.
Then we obtain
Φi (α, S, v, ϕ)
ϕi (vS)
αi
=
αiϕi (vS)
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)
αiϕi (vS)
∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
=
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
=
αjϕj (vS)
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)
αjϕj (vS)
∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
=
Φj (α, S, v, ϕ)
ϕj (vS)
αj
,
which is the condition in CTW.
Step 2: Uniqueness
Let F : D¯ −→ RN satisfy the above four axioms. Take i ∈ N and (α, S, v, ϕ) ∈ D¯, and
consider the following four cases:
Case 1 (i ∈ N \ S): Then, by IO, Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) = 0 = Φi (α, S, v, ϕ).
Case 2 (S = {i}): By PR, Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) = ϕi (vS), which is, by definition, equal to
Φi (α, S, v, ϕ).
Case 3 (i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2 and ϕi (vS) = 0): By SI, Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) = 0, which, again by
definition, is equal to Φi (α, S, v, ϕ).
Case 4 (i ∈ S, |S| ≥ 2 and ϕi (vS) > 0): We consider the following two subcases.
Subcase 4.1 (ϕk (vS) = 0 for all k ∈ S \ {i}): We have
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
∑
k∈S\{i}
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ) = ϕi (vS) = Φi (α, S, v, ϕ) ,
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where the first equation follows from PR and the second by SI.
Subcase 4.2 (ϕk (vS) > 0 for some k ∈ S \ {i}): Let S
′ = {l ∈ S \ {i} : ϕl (vS) > 0}. Then,
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
∑
k∈S\{i}
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ)
=
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
∑
k∈S′
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ)−
∑
k∈(S\{i})\S′
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ)
=
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
∑
k∈S′
Fk (α, S, v, ϕ)
=
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
∑
k∈S′
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ)αkϕk (vS)
αiϕi (vS)
=
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ)
αiϕi (vS)
∑
k∈S′
αkϕk (vS)
=
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS)−
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ)
αiϕi (vS)
∑
k∈S\{i}
αkϕk (vS) ,(2)
where the first equation follows from PR, the third one from ϕ ∈ S+ and SI, the fourth one
by CTW, and the last one by ϕk (vS) = 0 for each k ∈ (S \ {i}) \ S
′. Rearranging (2) leads
to
Fi (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)(
1 +
P
k∈S\{i} αkϕk(vS)
αiϕi(vS)
)
=
αiϕi (vS)∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) = Φi (α, S, v, ϕ) .
The four cases together establish F = Φ.
Step 3: Logical independence of axioms
Finally, in order to show independence of the axioms used for the characterization of Φ,
we present four composite solutions that satisfy exactly three of the four axioms and are
different from Φ.
Example 1 Define the composite solution F 1 : D¯ −→ RN by
F 1i (α, S, v, ϕ) =


∑
k∈S ϕk (vS) ,
if S = {i, j} , j 6= i, and
ϕj (vS) > ϕi (vS) = 0,
0,
if S = {i, j} , j 6= i, and
ϕi (vS) > ϕj (vS) = 0,
Φi (α, S, v, ϕ) , otherwise
(i ∈ N).
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It is easy to check that, by its construction, F 1 satisfies PR and IO. It also satisfies CTW
since this axiom only states a requirement for coalitions S, in which there are i, j ∈ S with
ϕi (vS) > 0 and ϕj (vS) > 0, and we have F
1 = Φ in such cases. However, F 1 violates SI
since for S = {i, j}, j 6= i, with ϕj (vS) > ϕi (vS) = 0 we have F
1
i (α, S, v, ϕ) = ϕj (vS) > 0.
Example 2 Next, consider F 2 : D¯ → RN defined by
F 2i (α, S, v, ϕ) =
{
αiϕi(vS)
α(N)
·
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS) , if i ∈ S,
0, otherwise
(i ∈ N),
where α(N) :=
∑
i∈N αi denotes the total sum of external weights. Clearly, this solution
satisfies SI and IO, and it is easy to check that it also satisfies CTW. However, F 2 violates
PR, since ∑
i∈S
F 2i (α, S, v, ϕ) =
∑
i∈S αiϕi (vS)
α (N)
·
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) 6=
∑
i∈S
ϕk (vS) .
Example 3 Let F 3 : D¯ → RN be defined by
F 3i (α, S, v, ϕ) =


αiϕi (vS)∑
k∈S αkϕk (vS)
·
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) , if i ∈ S,
αiϕi (vS)∑
k∈N\S αkϕk (vS)
·
∑
k∈N\S
ϕk (vS) , otherwise
(i ∈ N).
As F 3 coincides with Φ for all members in S, inspection of Step 1 reveals that this solution
satisfies all axioms but IO.
Example 4 Define F 4 : D¯ → RN by
F 4i (α, S, v, ϕ) =


(ϕi (vS))
αi∑
k∈S(ϕk (vS))
αk
·
∑
k∈S
ϕk (vS) , if i ∈ S,
0, otherwise
(i ∈ N),
and notice that it does not satisfy CTW since, for i, j ∈ S with ϕi (vS) > 0 and ϕj (vS) > 0,
F 4i (α,S,v,ϕ)
ϕi(vS)
αi
=
(ϕi (vS))
αi
αiϕi (vS)
·
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)∑
k∈S(ϕk (vS))
αk
6=
(ϕj (vS))
αj
αjϕj (vS)
·
∑
k∈S ϕk (vS)∑
k∈S(ϕk (vS))
αk
=
F 4j (α,S,v,ϕ)
ϕj(vS)
αj
.
It is easy to check that F 4 satisfies SI, PR, and IO. 
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4 Concluding remarks
The concept of a composite solution measures players’ overall payoff in a coalition when their
internal payoff in a game is given by a cooperative solution concept, and a vector of positive
weights describes asymmetries among the players outside the game. As an example, one may
consider simple games which describe possibilities to form winning coalitions. Traditionally,
power indices, such as the Shapley value, propose a distribution of power among the players.
However, a frequent criticism towards power indices is that they ignore characteristics besides
the data of the game (e.g., distribution of seats in a parliament). Composite solutions now
provide a tool to incorporate both, external weights and the data of the game to arrive at an
overall power distribution within a winning coalition, i.e., how to distribute responsibilities
within a government (cf. Dimitrov and Haake (2006)).
In addition to the properties used for the characterization of Φ, this composite solution
also satisfies other desirable properties we would like to mention. For example, Φ inherits
standard properties from the solution ϕ such as efficiency or the null player property. More-
over, if ϕ is symmetric, then the ratio of overall payoffs of any two players who are symmetric
in v is exactly the ratio of their external weights.
Finally, the reader may easily verify that if, on the one hand, external asymmetries
among the players are faded out (i.e., if we assume equal weights) then, roughly spoken, the
composite solution Φ coincides with the solution ϕ.3 If, on the other hand, internal differences
among the players in the game are ignored by the solution concept (e.g., if ϕi (vS) =
vS(S)
|S|
for each i ∈ S ⊆ N) then, since all players are symmetric, the ratio of overall payoffs of any
two players is the ratio of external weights. Hence Φ is in essence determined by the weights
vector α.
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